Why Won't Israel Recognize the Armenian Genocide?

Why Won't Israel Recognize the Armenian Genocide? 

It's Not Just About Turkey

Biden is preparing to recognize the Armenian genocide. So why is Israel, founded in the wake of genocide, holding out? How far does Israel's decision really rest on the state of relations with Ankara and Erdogan?

Dr. Eldad Ben Aharon

Apr. 22, 2021 11:18 AM

https://www.haaretz.com/

There’s been growing attention given to Israel’s policy on the Armenian genocide over the last two decades. Scholars, practitioners, journalists, activists and the general public are trying to map the different reasons and grievances framing Israel’s firm position: not to recognize the Armenian genocide.

Conventional wisdom points to dictums such as "Israeli relations with Turkey are too important" or that "Israel prefers Azerbaijan to the Armenians."

However, those reasons are too sweeping to explain a more complex phenomenon: which of Israel’s state institutions refuse recognition, and why.

I would argue that it is quite understandable why both consecutive Israeli governments, and the wider political and cultural spectrum represented in Israel’s parliament, the Knesset, hold what appears to be a wholly pragmatic stance despite it being counter-intuitive to normative and liberal democratic considerations, including the specific historical experience of the Jewish people.

-Why does the Knesset fail to pass the Armenian genocide bill time and time again, and how static or fluid is this stance for the future? And what impact does the growing legislative and normative trend of Western countries recognizing the genocide have on Israel's considerations, with the Biden administration as the latest example?

First of all: What does "recognition of the Armenian genocide" actually mean? In academic circles, despite the lack of a widely accepted cross-disciplinary definition, the term ‘recognition’ is generally understood  as a normative expression of the acknowledgement of a valuable human need: in this case, the understanding that the Ottoman Armenians experienced a genocide in 1915 and the countering of historical revisionism and denialism.

The legislative act of recognition contributes not only to commemoration, and to preserving Armenian historical heritage, but can also trigger an officially-sanctioned Memorial Day, even a state-backed national commemorative museum. This step is of critical importance to Armenian diaspora communities. Thus, the struggle for recognition is significant for three parties: the Armenians, the Turks (who oppose it), and the countries debating whether to recognize the Armenian genocide.

It is also a step that endorses the values of liberal democracy, by affirming core values such as the protection of human rights, justice and the protection of minorities against discrimination and violence. It also boosts international institutions dedicated to those values, such as the Internal Criminal Court and the UN’s Responsibility to Protect, a 2005 commitment to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

So, if recognition is a normative step that bolsters liberal democracy, there doesn’t seem an obvious obstacle for Israel. But there are two further, major, factors: Turkey, and the Holocaust.

Despite the cold diplomatic winds blowing between Ankara and Jerusalem for a number of years now, Israel maintains significant economic and strategic ties with Turkey. But if we examine the recognition policy of other states with far deeper engagement with Turkey, we see that there is no longer such an immutable correlation between ties with Ankara and genocide recognition - and the contrast with Israel becomes even more striking.

Take, for example, the legislatures of three NATO members: the United States, Germany, and the Netherlands. Just like Israel, they have been Ankara’s traditional allies since the early 1950s, and just like Israel, they were reluctant to recognize the Armenian genocide for more than 40 years. Their key reason was not to imperil Turkey’s key strategic role in the NATO alliance.

But between 2016 and 2019, something changed: the parliaments of all three countries formally recognized,  the Armenian genocide. And their status quo-defying decisions were neither hesitant nor ad hoc.

What had happened? The core trigger was a statement made by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. 

Then-Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan making his 2014 statement on the Armenian memorial day, calling the massacres by Ottoman Turks 'our shared pain' and offering his 'condolences'

Then-Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan making his 2014 statement on the Armenian memorial day, calling the massacres by Ottoman Turks 'our shared pain' and offering his 'condolences'Credit: AP

On 23 April 2014, the 99th anniversary of the genocide, Erdogan noted the deaths of the Ottoman Armenians who had perished alongside millions of people of "all religions and ethnicities" in 1915, describing the tragedy as "our shared pain."

Although Turkey’s president was finally acknowledging some basic historical facts, and offered his condolences to the Armenians, his message was really a sophisticated form of denial. There was no genocide, and the Ottomans’ successor state, Turkey, had nothing to apologize for.

But despite the obfuscation, his speech opened the door for some countries who wanted to alter their position. Ironically, Erdogan had effectively normalized the process of Armenian genocide recognition.

Armenian-Americans march in protest through the Little Armenia neighborhood of Hollywood, California demanding recognition by Turkey on the 103rd anniversary of the 1915 Armenian genocide, April 24, 2018.

Armenian-Americans march in protest through the Little Armenia neighborhood of Hollywood, California demanding recognition by Turkey on the 103rd anniversary of the 1915 Armenian genocide, April 24, 2Credit: AFP

There were other factors, too, that broke the recognition taboo. There was the crumbling relations between Turkey and its three allies, and the the related progressive weakening of NATO. The process of introspection and eventual acknowledgement of those countries’ own role in the perpetuation of Turkey’s denial. And growing scrutiny of Erdogan’s policies, especially towards the Kurds. For the Biden administration, it is a fulfillment of the promise to re-prioritize human rights in U.S. foreign policy. Hence, the recognition legislated by Germany, the Netherlands and the United States were a form of normative statement.

So what of Israel? Every April 2th, since 1989, the left-wing Meretz party has attempted and failed to pass the Armenian genocide bill through the Knesset. Erdogan’s 2014 statement made no significant change to their fortunes.

Knesset member and Meretz party head Tamar Zandberg introduces a bill to recognize the Armenian genocide, in 2018

Knesset member and Meretz party head Tamar Zandberg introduces a bill to recognize the Armenian genocide, in 2018Credit: Yitzhak Harari/Spokesman

In May 2018, Turkey expelled Israel’s ambassador, Eitan Na'eh, in the wake of the deaths of  61 Palestinians by the IDF in protests following Donald Trump’s recognition of  Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Erdoğan’s harsh rhetoric included the accusation that the "terrorist state" of Israel was itself perpetrating "genocide" against the Palestinians. But even this crisis didn’t move the dial in the Knesset.

So if changing geopolitical circumstances impacted the three NATO allies, why did it not affect Israel? Because there’s a basic, fixed issue, far less influenced by outside parties and events, but one that uniquely influences Israeli policy in regard to recognition of the Armenian genocide: the memory of the Holocaust as "unique."

In Israel, there is a commitment to "never again," a watchword in Israeli society, politics, and diplomacy ever since the birth of the State of Israel. But it has been embraced in its particularist form: "never again" to Jewish vulnerability in the face of murderous antisemitism, rather than the "never again to anyone," the form in which it is widely understood in, for example, the liberal American Jewish community.

That same particularism works retroactively, too. Analogies to the Holocaust are often slammed as the "trivialization" of Jewish suffering. That anathema to "sharing" the idea of being genocide victims, or the fear of competing genocide commemorations, has a specific locus.

The date of Israel’s Holocaust Remembrance Day is observed according to the Hebrew calendar, but it generally falls in the second half of April or early May. If the Knesset recognized the Armenian genocide, its April 24 Memorial Day would fall in close proximity, actualizing the threat of "competition" over genocide commemorations.

Armenian Israelis protest outside the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem against arms sales to Azerbaiijan during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict last year: Poster reads 'Erdogan, the Turkish Hitler'

Armenian Israelis protest outside the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem against arms sales to Azerbaiijan during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict last year: Poster reads 'Erdogan, the Turkish Hitler'Credit: Emil Salman

Despite these significant considerations weighing against recognition, there is still a chance to change Israel’s calculus. The tipping point is less likely to depend on a deterioration of relations with Turkey, or pressure from Azerbaijan, but rather on a strengthening of Israel’s own fractured democratic processes.

That there are problematic checks and balances between Israel’s legislative and executive branches is embodied in the unrestrained power the executive wields over the Knesset.

And because of the peculiarities of Israeli political culture and its unwieldly coalition governments, the executive enforces strict coalitionary discipline for many votes that in other legislatures would be free votes of conscience, or would better reflect the diversity of opinion within political parties.

This is an essential factor in the issue of passing an Armenian genocide bill: because coalition unity takes superiority over the freedom of action of Knesset members, there is very little room for manoeuvre.

With more stable governments giving coalition members more autonomy (a pipe-dream at present) it is likely the Armenian genocide recognition legislation would pass in the plenary, not least if legislators are lobbied by those liberal and younger Israelis who want to amplify the universalistic lessons of the Holocaust. For now, this modest hope will have to suffice.

***

Dr. Eldad Ben Aharon is a Minerva Fellow and Associate Researcher at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) and a lecturer at Leiden University. His research focuses on Israel's diplomatic history, Turkey’s foreign policy, intelligence history and counter-terrorism, Jewish and Armenian transnationalism and memory of the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide. Twitter: @EldadBenAharon 

Biden Preparing to Declare the "G" word

 Biden Preparing to Declare That Atrocities Against Armenia Were Genocide

The designation for the World War I-era killings would further fray U.S. relations with Turkey, but it is a risk the president appears willing to take to further human rights, officials said.

April 21, 2021

A ceremony last April in Yerevan, Armenia, commemorated the 105th anniversary of the beginning of the massacre of 1.5 million Armenians by Ottoman forces.Karen Minasyan/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

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WASHINGTON — More than a century after the Ottoman Empire’s killing of an estimated 1.5 million Armenian civilians, President Biden is preparing to declare that the atrocities were an act of genocide, according to officials familiar with the internal debate. The action would signal that the American commitment to human rights outweighs the risk of further fraying the U.S. alliance with Turkey

Mr. Biden is expected to announce the symbolic designation on Saturday, the 106th anniversary of the beginning of what historians call a yearslong and systematic death march that the predecessors of modern Turkey started during World War I. He would be the first sitting American president to do so, although Ronald Reagan made a glancing reference to the Armenian genocide in a 1981 written statement about the Holocaust, and both the House and the Senate approved measures in 2019 to make its recognition a formal matter of U.S. foreign policy.

At least 29 other countries have taken similar steps — mostly in Europe and the Americas, but also Russia and Syria, Turkey’s political adversaries.

A U.S. official with knowledge of the administration’s discussions said Mr. Biden had decided to issue the declaration, and others across the government and in foreign embassies said it was widely expected.

Jen Psaki, the White House press secretary, declined to comment on Wednesday except to note that the administration would have “more to say” on the topic on Saturday.

“The recognition by the United States will be a kind of moral beacon to many countries,” said Foreign Minister Ara Aivazian of Armenia./EPA, via Shutterstock

Foreign Minister Ara Aivazian of Armenia said in an interview on Wednesday that “the recognition by the United States will be a kind of moral beacon to many countries.”

“This is not about Armenia and Turkey,” Mr. Aivazian said. “This is about our obligation to recognize and condemn the past, present and future genocide.”

The designation and whether Mr. Biden would issue it have been seen as an early test of his administration’s dealings with the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey.

The two men have had a somewhat testy relationship in the past, in contrast to the generally warm treatment Mr. Erdogan received from President Donald J. Trump, and the genocide declaration could prompt a backlash from Turkey that risks its cooperation in regional military conflicts or diplomatic efforts. Past American presidents have held back from the declaration for that very reason, and Mr. Biden could still change his mind about issuing it.

While Turkey agrees that World War I-era fighting between the Muslim Ottomans and Christian Armenians resulted in widespread deaths, its leaders have resolutely rejected that the killing campaign that began in 1915 amounted to genocide.

Yet Turkish officials have been bracing for the genocide declaration ever since Mr. Biden committed to it during his presidential campaign, and Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu warned earlier this week that it would set back the already strained relationship between the two North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies.

“Statements that have no legal binding will have no benefit, but they will harm ties,” Mr. Cavusoglu said in an interview with the Turkish broadcaster Haberturk. “If the United States wants to worsen ties, the decision is theirs.”

The legal definition of genocide was not accepted until 1946, and officials and experts said Mr. Biden’s declaration would not carry any tangible penalties beyond humiliating Turkey and tainting its history with an inevitable comparison to the Holocaust.

“We stand firmly against attempts to pretend that this intentional, organized effort to destroy the Armenian people was anything other than a genocide,” a bipartisan group of 38 senators wrote in a letter to Mr. Biden last month, urging him to make the declaration. “You have correctly stated that American diplomacy and foreign policy must be rooted in our values, including respect for universal rights. Those values require us to acknowledge the truth and do what we can to prevent future genocides and other crimes against humanity.”

Mr. Biden appears intent on showing that his commitment to human rights — a pillar of his administration’s foreign policy — is worth any setback.

The genocide declaration signals that the United States is “willing to take geostrategic hits for our values,” said James F. Jeffrey, a former ambassador to Turkey who served in senior national security posts for the three presidents immediately preceding Mr. Biden.

Mr. Jeffrey, now the Middle East chair at the Wilson Center think tank in Washington, said there was little risk that Turkey would turn toward Russia, Iran or other American adversaries to replace its alliances with the West.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey and President Biden have had a somewhat testy relationship in the past.Adem Altan/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

But, he said, Mr. Erdogan could easily try to stymie or delay specific policies to aggravate the Biden administration, particularly in Syria, where Turkey’s tenuous cease-fire with Russia has allowed for already-narrowing humanitarian access, and in the Black Sea, to which American warships must first pass through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles on support missions to Ukraine.

“It may be harder to get Erdogan to agree to specific policies,” Mr. Jeffrey said.

He also raised the prospect that Turkey could force meticulous reviews to slow non-NATO operations at Incirlik Air Base, a way station for American forces and equipment in the region. Or, Mr. Jeffrey said, Turkey could do something to provoke new sanctions or reimpose ones that have been suspended, like taking military action against Kurdish fighters allied with American forces against the Islamic State in northeast Syria.

Pentagon officials have also noted the value of Turkish forces remaining in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of U.S. and other coalition troops by Sept. 11; Kabul and Ankara have a longstanding relationship that will allow some troops to remain in Afghanistan after the NATO nations leave.

Tensions between Turkey and the United States flared in December, when the Trump administration imposed sanctions against Ankara for its purchase and then test of a Russian missile defense system that Western officials said could expose NATO’s security networks to Moscow. The sanctions were imposed in the final month of Mr. Trump’s presidency, three years after Turkey bought the missile system, and only after Congress required them as part of a military spending bill.

Mr. Trump had pointedly promised to help Armenia last fall during its war against Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, noting the politically influential Armenian diaspora in the United States. His administration took a more evenhanded approach in trying to broker a peace agreement alongside Russia and France and, ultimately, Armenia surrendered the disputed territory in the conflict with Azerbaijan, which was backed by Turkey.

In the Wednesday interview, Mr. Aivazian, Armenia’s foreign minister, seized on Turkey’s military role in the Nagorno-Karabakh war as an example of what he described as “a source of expanding instability” in the region and the eastern Mediterranean Sea.

He said the genocide designation would serve as a reminder to the rest of the world if malign values are not countered.

“I believe bringing dangerous states to the international order will make our world much more secure,” Mr. Aivazian said. “And we will be witnessing less tragedies, less human losses, once the United States will reaffirm its moral leadership in these turbulent times.”

https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/21/us/politics/biden-armenia-genocide-turkey.html?smid=tw-share